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CHAPTER I
The issue of busing to achieve desegregation of the
Boston public school system has its roots in the U.S.
Supreme Court's landmark decisions in 1954 and 1955. Those
decisions in Brown vs. Board of Education, (347 U.S. 483 of
1954)^ and the findings a year later in Brown vs. Board of
2Education, (349, U.S. 254) were the official beginnings of
a struggle between federal courts and communities charged
with desegregation of their schools. As Howard Ozmon re-
flects
,
The two Supreme Court decisions form
the legal backdrop from which busing
has become an issue of crisis propor-
tional to a moral crisis.
3
The Brown decision represented a mandate to American
society. They were the foundation of a series of court
rulings that led to Federal District Court Judge Wendell
Arthur Garritty, Jr.'s findings of June 1974. Ozmon con-
curs that
The direction Of that legal mandate
was to root out and invalidate as
unconstitutional any form of de jure
segregation of public schools, that
is segregation required and upheld
by law
.
Lt
In the Brown decisions the Supreme Court had limited itself
to de jure segregation in assaulting racial inequality and
1
2upholding the equal rights protection of the Constitution's
fourteenth amendment. For the time being, de facto segrega-
tion remained unchallenged. However limited, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed its decision of 1954 a year later by
asserting that "once the state had undertaken the obliga-
tion to provide public education, it must be available to
5
all on equal terms"
.
Initially, the U.S. Supreme Court not only limited its
jurisdiction to de jure segregation, but delegated the task
of desegregation to lower courts. Little guidance was of-
fered except to require compliance with constitutional obli-
gabions to equal rights. In Briggs vs. Elliot, 1955, the
U.S. Supreme Court was more concerned with articulating what
it had not decided than with formulating a standard of dese-
gregation for lower courts to implement and school officials
to follow. The Court opinion claimed that it
has not decided that the federal
courts are to take over or regulate
the public schools ... has not decided
that states must mix persons of dif-
ferent races in the school or deprive
them of the right to choose the schools
they attend. What it has decided... is
that a state may not deny to any person
on account of race the right to attend
any school that it maintains. 7
The Court had concluded in this case that the U.S. Constitu-
tion forbade discrimination without demanding integration.
Busing orders and a more affirmative role for the Court and
local authority still lay in the distant future.
3The U.S. Supreme Court took its first steps toward for-
mulating a standard or offering guidance to lower courts in
the case of U.S, vs. Jefferson County Board of Education. 8
A duty for local school authority to assume an affirmative
role in eliminating segregation was inaugurated by this
court opinion. The court declared that "the only desegre-
gation plan that meets Constitutional standards is one that
9
works"
. This new direction of the court received welcomed
support from the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 clearly reaffirmed the
responsibility of local school authority to end segregation.
Section 407 of the legislation "authorized the Attorney
General to maintain desegregation actions upon the receipt
of written complaints". 18 Reflecting Congressional percep-
tion of popular disapproval of forced busing, the same sec-
tion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 specifically stated
that the Act did not empower anyone to issue a busing order.
Although this anti-busing sentiment was incorporated into
the legislation, the Congress did not and could not deny or
restrict the Court's power to insure compliance with Consti-
tutional standards. When the Court did discern busing as
necessary to achieve desegregation, it would reason that the
Civil Rights Act "in no way withdrew from the courts their
equitable remedial powers". 11
Although the U.S. Supreme Court had affirmed the need
for an effective desegregation strategy by local school
4authorit
,
it had been ambiguous as to what was and was not
affirmative action. Since the "Jefferson County" decision,
conflicting views over the exact nature of the affirmative
duty imposed upon school officials developed. In 1968, the
Supreme Court moved to eliminate some of the controversy.
Numerous freedom of choice" plans for desegregation were
ruled ineffective in ending segregation. That ruling came
in the case of Green vs. County School Board.
^
The freedom of choice plan to comply with the Consti-
tutional obligation to desegregate was deemed ineffective
because it did not guarantee desegregation. Black children
attending white schools faced unchecked intimidation, and
white children were simply transferred to predominantly
white schools whenever necessary to evade an influx of black
students. The unruly nature of the "freedom of choice" al-
ternative had, in this particular county, resulted in over-
lapping bus routes, drawn by school officials, that sustained
segregated schools. The Court concluded that local school
authorities were
charged with the affirmative duty
to take whatever steps might be
necessary to convert to a unitary
system in which racial discrimina-
tion would be eliminated, root and
branch . 13
Busing orders were not specifically authorized because Kent
County, Virginia, was a rural area without segregated housing
patterns. It was not clear that forced busing was necessary
5i fenk-dy the particular case ider consideration. The
Court's implied authorization, however, was unquestioned.
Three years later, the Supreme Court explicitly de-
fended the use of busing to achieve desegregation. The case
of Swan vs. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education 14 was
the first case in which a busing order came up for Supreme
Court review. In this case, the school board's plan for
desegregation included mathematic ratios for racial mixing
of school assignments. The plan was ineffective, however,
because it allowed for pupil assignment to the school near-
est a child's home. Given the existence of a segregated
housing pattern within the Charlotte-Mecklenburg area, this
provision of their plan had made it necessary to use busing
to achieve desegregation. The Supreme Court Swan decision
concurred with a lower court ruling that busing was indeed
necessary and constitutionally justified.
This U.S. Supreme Court decision represented the first
explicit authorization for a busing order. The constitu-
tional duty to provide equal rights and desegregate public
school systems now meant that "busing as a remedy might be
15
constitutionally necessary in some circumstances". " The
Court further ruled that:
school authorities have an obligation
to prepare students for a pluralistic
world by having a ratio of black and
white in each school reflecting the^g
portion of the district as a whole.
Further reflecting just how far the Court had altered its
brole since the Brown decisions, the Court added that
If school authorities failed in this
obligation, a district court had the
power to provide a remedy insuring a
unitary system. 17
Busing to achieve desegregation could only be limited by
consideration of the health of the children, distance tra-
veled, and time involved.
Since the Brown decisions, the Supreme Court had
focused only on the elimination of de jure segregation.
The inclusion of de facto segregation as properly subject
to redress under the fourteenth amendment right to equal
rights came in 1973. The case was Keyes vs. School District
1
8
#1. This was the first case in which segregation of a
non-statutory nature was reviewed by the Court.
The School authority was held responsible for the cre-
ation and elimination of a segregated school system even
though no clear motive to do so existed. In this case, the
Court chose to employ a looser standard of intent than in
the strict legal sense where motive is the central question.
The formulation of why the school district was responsible
stood as a guide for lower courts in assessing responsibi-
lity for de facto segregation. The Court argued that
School officials' actions and inactions
which have the reasonably foreseeable
effect of maintaining or increasing
school segregation and which actually
do cause segregation, create an infe-
rence of an intent to segregate. This
inference of de jure segregation may
be rebutted only by a convincing showing
7that legitimate policy reasons com-
pelled the challenged decisions.
In summary, the Brown decisions had ruled that segre-
gated school systems were unconstitutional. A year later
in Briggs vs. Elliot, the Court drew back from an active
role in desegregation by stating the U.S. Constitution did
not demand integration but merely forbade segregation.
The continuing reality of segregated school systems com-
pelled the Supreme Court into radically altering its early
passive role in desegregation. The aforementioned Jeffer-
son County Board of Education case established the validity
and necessity for a more affirmative role for local school
authority. Green vs. County School Board helped to articu-
late that role by ruling against "freedom of choice" dese-
gregation plans. In 1971, the case of Swan vs. Charlotte
formally justified busing orders as constitutionally accept-
able tools for desegregation. The Supreme Court extended
the constitutional obligation to desegregate to de facto
segregated school systems in the Keyes vs. School District
#1 ruling.
From merely ruling against the existence of segregated
schools in the 1954 landmark case, the Court had, in the
Keyes case, justified the possibility of a federal court
directly assuming responsibility for desegregating a school
system. For the Boston public schools, as well as others
throughout the county, the path to desegreg. 1 took as
8long as the Court's transformation of the 19b4 Brown deci-
sion .
It is ironic that the Boston public school system be-
came a center of national attention over the busing issue.
Historically, Massachusetts and Boston have been leaders in
educational reform and innovations regarding busing and
desegregation. In 1838 the Massachusetts legislature passed
the school union law. The unique legislation called for a
consolidation of smaller schools. Consolidation was dis-
cerned as a more efficient use of funds to improve the edu-
cational environment. In 1869, Massachusetts enacted pio-
neering legislation which enabled school authorities to use
tax money to provide transportation for school children.
In 1855, the city of Boston became the first to outlaw
2 0
school segregation. In 1965, the Massachusetts legisla-
ture was the first in making racially imbalanced schools
illegal. Before the enactment of the Racial Imbalance Act of
1965 and afterward as well, the Boston public school system
was segregated.
Boston is a city whose neighborhoods are clearly drawn
by racial and ethnic factors. The Civil Rights Commission
concluded that by at least the early 1960 's, if not before,
"discrimination against various groups has been a part of
21Boston life"
.
The Commission also determined that the
public school system was undeniably segregated. In 1960,
yalmost 80% of elementary-level black pupils attended schools
with a black majority student population. Over 35% of the
black students attended schools of 90 to 100% black enroll-
ment. A 1961 plan of open enrollment failed miserably to
achieve desegregation.
An advisory committee to the State Board of Education
examined the problem and formally acknowledged the existence
of at .least 45 racially imbalanced Boston schools. Specifi-
cally, the task force found that the reality of de facto
segregation was harmful to both black and white children,
and recommended a short-term strategy of busing 5,000 pu-
2 2pils. In 1963, half of the city's 5,000 black high school
and junior high students boycotted school to protest segre-
gation policies. A year later, a similar’ protest drew 14,000
students. The target of the protest and of increasing State
Board of Education pressure was the Boston School Committee.
By the mid-1960's, the five Boston school committee
members were being regul lrly returned to office. As Alan
Lupo
,
aide to Mayor Kevin White, contends,
the committee had come to symbolize
something ... to those white people
who... feared the growing power and
population of Boston's black cominun
ity. The committee symbolized
resistance . 2 3
The School Cominittee had little reservation about busing
black students past white schools with empty seats to other
black schools. By its method of pupil assignments, style of
10
drawing district lines, and controlled feeder patterns to
city-wide schools, the committee had created and maintained
a segregated school system. 24
Despite Supreme Court rulings against school segrega-
tion and the findings of the State Board of Education task
force, the Boston School Committee remained opposed to dese-
gregation. Determined to preserve the neighborhood school
and lo resist forced busing, the committee "maintained its
general position through 1965". 25 The school committee
even thwarted a popular, privately supported plan to desegre
gate called "Operation Exodus", which transported black stu-
dents to predominantly white schools with money and manpower
supplied by parents and concerned citizens. The program was
eventually undermined by the school committee, determined to
thwart any desegregation effort. Students participating in
"Operation Exodus" faced "locked doors, physical segregation
in separate classrooms. . .and desks unbolted from the floor
2 6and removed from the classroom".
Iv
In 1965, the Massachusetts legislature attempted to end
segregation in state public school systems. The Massachu-
setts Racial Imbalance Act of 1965 was the first of its kind
in the nation. Spurred by the Supreme Court ruling in the
"Jefferson County" decision calling for an affirmative role
in dismantling segregated schools. Republican Governor John
Volpe and liberal Democrats in the legislature attacked de
facto segregation in the school systems of the state. The
11
progressive legislation called for swift correction of
racially imbalanced schools, defined as schools with a
student population of more than 50% minority composition.
Strong penalties were provided for recalcitrant school
committees which failed to take appropriate action. The
act specifically proclaimed that "the commissioner of educa-
tion could refuse to certify all state aid for uncorrected
27
schools". This severe penalty for a continuation of
racially imbalanced schools was, however, accompanies! by
vague guidelines to follow. The act did not require inte-
gration of all-white schools and explicitly prohibited the
• 9 Qinvoluntary, inter-district transportation of students.
The Boston school committee continued its fight against
integration and ignored the intent of the legislature.
Seven years after the passage of the act, the reality was
that "the number of racially imbalanced schools (in Boston)
2 9had increased from 45 to 67".
The Boston school committee frustrated the spirit as
well as the letter of the Racial Imbalance Act in several
ways. It was able to do so because the committee controlled
local school policy. As Chairman John McDonough commented,
the responsibility of the committee
is to oversee and formulate and
direct the policy which will be
used in the school system or im-
posed in the school systems here
in the city of Boston. 33
The general strategy for obstruction developed as one of
12
formulistic compliance followed by procrastination and
evasion on technical grounds". 31 Black and civil rights
leaders who petitioned the committee were ignored. Debate
about desegregation was cut off by a majority vote of the
committee members. So blatant was the committee's effort
to block desegregation that 671 Chinese students were clas-
sified as white
.
3 2
The State Department of Education also had little suc-
cess with altering the Boston school committee's anti-
desegregation policy. Charged with carrying out the poli-
cies of the State Board of Education, the Commissioner of
Education found himself opposing the Committee over elimina-
tion of racially imbalanced schools. Frustrated in his at-
tempts to eliminate Boston school committee resistance, he
terminated state aid to the city's school systems on two
3 3separate occasions. Because the school committee refused
to formulate plans to do away with racially imbalanced
schools, the State Board formulated four plans of its own
between 19C7 and 1970. The committee response to another
plan in 1972 was a two-page report suggesting that a "free-
dom of choice" approach to desegregation be adopted. Three
months later, the committee submitted relevant data for
developing the plan. Similar alternatives had been declared
ineffective by the Supreme Court in 1968 in the case of Green
vs. County School Board.
Two years after the U.S. Supreme Court upheld busing
13
orders as constitutional, the State Board of Education pre-
sented another short-term plan for reducing the racially
imbalanced schools. The plan intended to reduce that number
from 61 to 42 by reorganizing the grade structure and busing
19,000 students to different schools. In March of 1974, the
committee began to notify parents of pupil assignments pur-
suant to the state's plan. The reason for committee obedi-
ence was a state Supreme Court order to implement the plan.
After years of struggle
State education officials and state
courts had finally come around to
taking the hardest of hard lines
with the Boston School Committee." 1
Submission to the state plan appeared to be temporary, how-
ever, because new legislation modified the Racial Imbalance
Act in June of 1974. The modifications specifically with-
drew the State Board's power to redistrict and order busing.
Although the legislature negated the State Board's
short-term plan, Judge Wendell Garritty, Jr. promulgated
his findings and decision in the case of Tallulah Morgan,
et . al. vs. James Hennigan, et . al., during the same month.
Filed two years earlier by a local chapter of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the case
charged continual desegregation by the school committee.
The State Board of Education was also named as a co-defendant
with the committee, but Garritty ruled that "the state had
exercised all the authority it had within its limited juris-
14
diction"
.
3 b
full responsibility, according to Garritty, lay with
the school committee because:
the evidence was clear... that school
officials had knowingly carried out a
systematic program of segregation and
had intentionally maintained a dual
system. . .and deliberately dragged
their feet in formulating plans to
lessen ... racial imbalance. 36
Rejecting the defense of uncontrollable policy decisions
due to segregated housing patterns, Garritty concluded that
the committee's argument had no "relevance to the defendant's
practices with respect to faculty and staff assignments,
open enrollment and controlled transfers or feeder patterns". 3 ^
Citing the Supreme Court ruling in the case of "School
District # 1" permitting a court to issue orders to accom-
plish what local authorities failed or refused to do, Gar-
ritty ordered that the most recent State Board of Education
short-term plan be put into effect by September of 1974.
This action would be followed by the development and imple-
mentation of a full-term program for desegregation. The
school committee attempted to modify the plan, but was unsuc-
cessful. With little time to plan, the desegregation order
went into effect in September. Generally, implementation of
the plan went smoothly, with the highly publicized exceptions
at the Dorchester and South Boston high schools.
Impetus for the success of Phase II of the desegrega-
tion plan was the Attorney General's refusal to intervene on
15
behalf of the committee by appealing Garritty
' s ruling to
the Supreme Court . 38 The Supreme Court also refused to hear
four appeals to Che Garritty decision. Still bitterly op-
posed to desegregation, the majority of committee members
had little choice but to accept the federal court ruling.
As John Kerrigan conceded, "It would appear that we he ve
exhausted some of our legal remedies ." 33 Although the com-
mittee found the implementation of the desegregation pl^n
distasteful, the plan did proceed. Chairman McDonough
admitted
...the school committee will do what
Judge Garritty directs them to do.
They will not, however, take this
plan in their arms as their own...
will not go any further than doing
^
what Judge Garritty directly orders.
Nineteen years after the first Supreme Court decision
in Brown vs. Board of Education and nine years after the
passage of the Racial Imbalance Law, the Boston public
school system took its first step toward desegregation. A
Federal district court judge had provided that leadership.
The U.S. Constitution defended his power to do so. Anti-
desegregation forces had confronted
a federal court order, and no mayor,
no school committee, no governor, no
president is going to stop it (dese-
gregation) now. 14 !
Our courts may not have the power of the purse, but "the
M 2
power of final decision is given to the judicial branch".
CHAPTER I I
Until Judge Garritty's ruling in 1974, the Boston
school committee frustrated efforts to desegregate the
city's school system. Repeated attempts by the state
government and several pro-desegregation decisions by the
U.S. Supreme Court had not overcome the committee's resis-
tance to desegregation. In 1974, the direct involvement
ot the federal court ended the committee's power over the
desegregation question.
The intuitively correct understanding of who wielded
power with respect to the Boston busing issue is that the
school committee, until 1974, exercised power over the
state government and the U.S. Supreme Court. After June
1974, the federal court exercised power over the committee
and desegregation finally began. For now, the correctness
of this intuitive understanding of power shall be assumed
for the purposes of this thesis.
The following chapters of this thesis will examine
three definitions of power. Each definition will be stud-
ied to determine if the power of the school committee and
court is reflected. Definitions of power which do reflect
the intuitive understanding of power will be considered suc-
cessful definitions. Why some definitions do and do not
16
17
succeed will also be explored.
Felix Oppenheim defines the exercise of power as: 1
P (a powerholder) exercises power
over R (a respondent) with respect
to X (an action of R) means that P
influences or coerces R to do X.
Oppenheim clarifies the definition by explaining
' P influences R to do X' means that
P performs some action Y involving
a communication which causes R to
choose X
and that
P coerces R to do X if P does some-
thing which causes R’s attempt at
not doing X to fail and hence con-
strains him to do X.
(or)
’ P restrains R from doing X' means
that P performs some action Y which
causes R's attempt at doing X to
fail
.
Applied to this case study, the Oppenheim definition
has some success. The intuitively correct understanding of
the committee’s power is reflected by Oppenheim ' s definition.
Employing the definition results in the true statement: The
Boston school committee (P) restrained the State government
and U.S. Supreme Court (R) from implementing a desegregation
policy until 1974. The school committee (P) did procrasti-
nate, ignore and evade (action Y) the direct orders of the
state government to desegregate which caused the state gov-
• eminent ’ s (R) attempt to desegregate Boston schools to fail.
The committee’s tactics of evading and procrastinating are
18
properly subsumed by Oppenheim's notion of action. Both
'doing X' and refraining from doing X are actions, according
to Oppenheim. The inaction by the committee is therefore
mirrored by the definition as well as its power to block
desegregation
.
The definition also mirrors the power of the federal
court ruling by Judge Garritty in 1974. Judge Garritty's
(F) ruling in favor of implementing the state desegregation
pllan (action Y) caused the school committee (R) to finally
begin desegregating the school system. More specifically,
the ruling by Garritty coerced rather than influenced the
committee to implement desegregation plans. Public state-
ments critical of the decision by committee members persis-
ted, but did not deter Garritty from actually implementing
his order to desegregate. Judge Garritty's (P) decision to
desegregate (action Y) left the committee (R) little choice
but to abandon segregation policies (R's attempt at not
doing X) and begin desegregation (X). The powerlessness of
the school committee after the Garritty ruling is faithfully
reflected by the definition.
The applied Oppenheim definition also correei ly states
the powerlessness of the state government to implement a
desegregation policy in Boston prior to 1974. Use of the
Oppenheim definition correctly states that: the state legis-
lature (P) passed the Racial Imbalance Act of 1965 (action Y)
but did not cause the school committee (R) to desegregate
19
the public school system (X). Likewise, the state Board of
Education (P) twice withheld state aid to the committee
(action 1), but failed to constrain the committee (R) to
desegregate (X). The powerlessness of the Supreme Court
is also captured by the definition. The statement "the
. >upr eme Court (I ) promulgated several pro—desegregation
decisions since 1954 (action Y) but did not influence or
coerce the School Committee (R) to desegregate the school
system (X)" can be derived from the Oppenheim definition.
Another merit of the Oppenheim definition is that it
correct ly differentiates between which form of power is and
is not relevant to the Boston busing issue. The power of
the committee was its ability to successfully restrain the
implementation of desegregation by the state government and
U.S. Supreme Court. The committee neither influenced nor
coerced the state or Supreme Court to cease their calls for
desegregation. Oppenheim' s definition accurately reflects
this in the statement: The Boston school committee (P) re-
fused to desegregate the school system (action Y), but did
not cause the state government or Supreme Court (R) to aban-
don its desegregation designs (X). The State Board of Edu-
cation, for example, drew up four desegregation plans which
were successively ignored by the committee. During that
period the State Board of Education did not acquiesce to
the school committee's anti -desegregation sentiment.
A potential problem with the Oppenheim definition is
20
that, wuen applied to the case study, some actions which
intuitively are not instances of power may be interpreted
as such. For example, the state's withholding of funds
from the committee to coerce its compliance with the dese-
gregation mandate is properly understood as an unsuccessful
attempt by the state to exercise power. The state's threat
to do so, ind not the committee's defiance or indifference,
is an attempt to exercise power. However, the Oppenheim
definition appears to support the idea that the committee's
disregard of the possible state action is also an instance
of power.
According to the definition, the committee (P) caused
the state (R) to withhold state aid (X) by ignoring (action
Y) their threat to do so. Oppenheim does avoid this prob-
lem by (1) distinguishing between power and causation, and
(2) limiting actions which are instances of power to influ-
2encing or coercive action. Oppenheim clearly states,
I am defining 'P exercised power
over R's doing X' not by P's ac-
tion Y causes R to do X, but P's
influence or coercive action Y
causes R to do X.
This clarification by Oppenheim is his basis for drawing a
definite distinction between the concepts 'causing 1 and
'exercising power'. Actions which are not influential or
coercive may cause response X or Y but do not properly stand
as instances of power. The indifference of the schoo] com-
mittee to the state threat to cut olf funds did cause the
21
actual withholding of aid. However, because their action
was not influential or coercive, it does not stand as an
instance of power. The Oppenheim distinction thus elimin-
ates the problem of his definition applying to actions
which are intuitively not instances of power in this case
study
.
William Connolly suggests a different definition of
. # Qpower. Connolly defines power as meaning
A exercises power over B when he
is responsible for some X that
increases the costs, risks, or
difficulties to B in promoting
B ' s desires
.
Advocating that a generally negative moral point of view
fashions the concept of power, Connolly argues that a wiel-
der of power is generally bTamable for not respecting the
right of those over whom power is exercised. To exercise
power 1
,
according to the Connolly perspective, one need only
increase the costs or risks to another doing something. The
respondent does not have to be prevented from doing X or be
compelled to do something. Applied to the problem of dese-
gregation in Boston, the Connolly definition does not func-
tion well.
The definition works best when the school committee
stands for A, the power wielder. The following statement
results
:
The school committee (A) exercised
power over the state government (B)
because it increased the costs, risks
or difficulties to the state in pro-
moting the Racial Imbalance Act of
1965 and numerous desegregation plans.
No doubt surrounds the point that, until 1974, the school
committee increased the difficulties, costs or risks to the
state in securing a desegregated Boston school system. How-
ever, the Connolly definition does not entirely reflect the
full power of the school committee.
The school committee did more than increase the diffi-
culties, costs or risks to the state’s desegregation desires.
The school committee thoroughly frustrated and prevented the
state from realizing its desegregation designs. Although
successfully mirroring the intuitive assumption of the school
committee's power, the Connolly definition remains deficient
in capturing the full scope of the committee's action to be
explained as an instance of power.
Likewise, the definition only appears to reflect the
assumed power of Judge Garritty after 1974. The applied
definition creates the statement
Judge Garritty (A) ruled that the
state's desegregation plan be im-
plemented CX) which increased the
costs, risks, and difficulties for
the school committee (B) to perpe-
tuate a segregated school system.
Again, the Connolly proposal does not capture the full scope
of action to be explained as an instance of power that it
should. By the admission of school committee members them-
selves, the decision left no options available for the com-
2 3
mittee to persist in its resistance to the desegregation
mandate. The decision did not merely increase the diffi-
culties, costs, or risks to the school committee. Judge
Garritty effectively eliminated the committee's power on
the issue. Desegregation finally began because the com-
mittee's power ended.
Another difficulty with the Connolly definition is the
result that both the state government and U.S. Supreme Court
can be understood as exercising power prior to 1974. This
is contrary to the assumed power of the school committee and
powerlessness of the state and Court prior to 1974. The
definition produces the statements:
The State Board of Education (A)
withdrew state aid to the School
Committee (X) which increased the
costs, risks, and difficulties for
the school committee (B) to perpe-
tuate a segregated school system.
and
The U.S. Supreme Court (A) promul-
gated several anti-desegregation
decisions since 1954 (X) which in-
creased the difficulties, risks,
and costs to the school committee
(B) continuing to resist desegre-
gation .
Both statements are true because the state and Court
did increase the costs, risks, and difficulties for the com-
mittee. By the Connolly definition, then, all three exer-
cised power over each other prior to 19/4. The problem is
that only the school committee prevailed with regard to the
24
issue of desegregation. The intuitive assumption of the com-
mittee's power, prior to 1974, and powerlessness of the state
and Court means that the Connolly definition is unsuccessful.
Similarly, the intuitively correct assumption that the
school committee's power was terminated by Judge Garritty
'
s
ruling in 1974 is not supported by the Connolly definition.
Long after the order to implement the state's Phase I plan
for desegregation,
the Boston school committee members
(A) continued to publicly criticize
CX) the Judge and the order which
increased the costs, risks, and dif-
ficulties for Garritty (B) lo imple-
ment the desegregation plan.
According to the definition, the committee exercised power
over Judge Garritty as Judge Garritty exercised power over
the committee with respect to the same issue. In conclu-
sion, the distinction between the power wielder and the
powerless is a distinction which the Connolly definition is
not equipped to make.
The Connolly definition could avoid the problems that
surface when applied to the Boston busing issue. The defi-
nition could distinguish between the power of the school
committee prior to 1974 and the powerlessness of the state
government. Connolly's definition could also completely
capture the entire scope of action it should to explain the
power of the school committee and Judge Garritty. lo over-
come these difficulties, a different understanding of the
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definition might be advanced. Instead of merely increasing
the costs, risks, or difficulties for another, to exercise
power might mean increasing the costs, risks, or difficulties
so that another actually did or did not do something.
Connolly, however, specifically rules out this interpreta-
4tion or suggestion. Connolly states
...(the respondent's) conduct could
vary from my expectations, but as
long as the element introduced did
in fact increase the costs or risks
in meeting his interests, wishes or
obligations, I would have exercised
power over him.
The Connolly definition, therefore, cannot and does not suc-
ceed when applied to the case study under consideration in
this thesis.
Anthony de Crespigny suggests that intentional action
alone should stand as an instance of exercising power. De
,
5
Crespigny defines power as
the capacity of an actor to affect
the actions of others in accordance
with his own intention.
The basis of de Crespigny ' s definition referring only to
intentional action is ordinary language. To de Crespigny,
6
the idea of unintentionally exercising power
is confusing because it is unnatural
to talk of an exercise of power when
effects on conduct are produced which
are not in conformity with an actor's
intention
.
De Crespigny does agree with Partridge , however, that the
idea of unintentionally exercising influence is defensible.
2 6
Only when the question of exercising power is raised must a
reference to intention be made, according to de Crespigny.
Applied to the Boston busing issue, the de Crespigny
definition is successful. Both the power and powerlessness
of the school committee, state government and U.S. Supreme
Court is accurately reflected by the definition. Prior to
1974, the school committee was able to prevent the implemen-
tation of the desegregation plans by the state government
and the desegregation policy of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Clearly, the school committee's action was in accordance
with its intention to maintain a segregated, neighborhood
school system. The intent of the Supreme Court and state
government action to desegregate the schools did not affect
the school committee's decision to delay and avoid desegre-
gation .
In 1974, the Garritty ruling to begin desegregation did
affect the action of the school committee. Desegregation
finally began. The intent of Judge Garritty to fulfill the
desegregation mandate of the U.S. Supreme Court signaled an
end to the school committee's power with respect to desegre-
gation .
The de Crespigny definition of power appears to encoun-
ter a problem in explaining the power of Judge Garritty.
After the federal court ruling, the school committee, by the
members' own testimony, had no choice but to begin desegre-
g
De Crespigny maintains thatgat ion
.
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when one actor exercises power in
relation to another, the behavior
of the latter is voluntary-~"volun-
tary" in the sense that, in prin-
ciple, it is subject to choice.
According to this criterion. Judge Garritty did not exercise
power over the School Committee because the committee's
action was not voluntary. Such a finding would mean the
definition did not successfully reflect the intuitively
correct assumption of Judge Garritty ' s power in 1974. This
difficulty is overcome, however 1
,
because in principle, the
committee did actually have a choice of ignoring the court
and facing imprisonment
.
Having applied three definitions of power to the issue
of busing to achieve desegregation in Boston, I will examine
the question: Should only intentional action and Intended
effects be considered as instances of exercising power?
Examining the success and failure of the definitions, I will
determine what attention, if any, they pay to intention.
More importantly, I will try to determine whether a defini-
tion's success or failure results from including only inten-
tional action and effects or not. Answers to these questions
will, hopefully, be a starting point for fashioning yet
another viewpoint about political power.
CHAPTER III
In this chapter of the thesis, the focus of attention
will turn directly to the question of intention in defini-
tion of political power. The role which intention plays,
if any, in the success or failure of the definitions ap-
plied to the Boston busing issue will be scrutinized. Whe-
ther or not a failure to pay attention to intended action
and effects commits a definition to counter-intuitive inter-
pretation shall also be examined. Such counter-intuitive
interpretation would offer support to the idea of limiting
political power to intentional acts because, as Champlin
points out /
A definition of power, however
coherent and faithful to the terms
it uses, is only the beginning; in
order to prove its usefulness, it
must aid political analysis.
Pursuant to this effort, an understanding of intention
shall first be suggested.
Intentional action is behavior which an agent self-
consciously performs in pursuit of some interest, usually
2
formed as a result of some deliberation. In contrast,
unintentional action is behavior whose effects or possible
effects an agent is unaware of, or did not self-consciously
plan; which may or may not be in the agent's interests; and
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which is usually done without deliberation. 3 Intended
effects are consequences of an action which an agent self-
consciously hopes will occur and tries to bring about be-
cause they are consistent with his or her interests. Unin-
tended effects are consequences of an action which an agent
does not expect will happen but do, or which in agent knows
will happen but does not intend. 4
According to the findings of Chapter II of this thesis,
Felix Oppenheim* s definition of power enjoyed the most suc-
cess when applied to the Boston busing issue. The power of
the school committee was mirrored by the definition, as was
its eventual .powerlessness in 1974. The power of Judge
Garritty, and the powerlessness of the Supreme Court and
state government were also reflected by the definition.
Oppenheim specifically rejects the idea of limiting his
definition of power to intentional action. According to
Oppenheim, several examples of unintended action that should
be comprehended as instances of power would not be if the
definition of power applied only to intentional activity.
This position is defended by Oppenheim despite his own view
concerning a paradigmatic case of exercising power. As
5Oppenheim points out,
...The paradigmatic case of exer-
cising power, especially in the
political sphere, is: R wants to
do X, this is contrary to some pur-
pose of P; P therefore wants R not
to do X; P therefore deliberately
performs some action Y which influ-
ences of coerces R not to do X.
What I shall argue is that the Oppenheim definition impli-
citly does and must limit itself to intentional activity,
despite Oppenheim' s insistence to the contrary.
As was noted earlier, the Oppenheim definition encoun-
tered the potential problem of equating "power" with social
causation. In this case study, action which is not under-
stood as an instance of power might be construed as such by
the Oppenheim definition. The example I employed was the
school committee's refusal to begin desegregation after the
State Board of Education threatened withdrawal of state aid
to the city school system. According to the Oppenheim defi-
nition, the action of the school committee might be construed
as an instance of power because it did cause the state to
carry through with its threat. The school committee's (P)
refusal to begin desegregation (X) caused the state (R) to
choose to withdraw state aid (Y). The Oppenheim remedy to
this potential problem is also the basis of my argument that
unintentional action should be excluded from his definition.
To avoid equating all causal relationships with his
definition of power, Oppenheim distinguishes between any
action X or Y and influence or coercive action X or Y . Even
though some action X or Y might and does cause another ac-
tion, according to Oppenheim, only the influence or co ire Lve
action may properly stand as an instance of power. ihis
distinction between causing and exercising power rescues his
definition from equating any and all causal relationships as
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instances of power being exercised. Because of this distinc-
tion, the school committee's refusal to begin desegregation
cannot, by Oppenheim's definition, be correctly understood
as an instance of power with respect to the withholding of
funds by the state. The school committee's refusal, although
causing the state to carry through with its threat, was not
a coercive or influential action. This application of the
Oppenheim position to the Boston busing issue is quite simi-
lar to the example Oppenheim uses to illustrate the distinc-
tion between causing and power.
In the example advanced by Oppenheim, two persons want
to enter a post office. One person (R) sees the other (P)
try to open the door but finds it locked. Seeing that P can-
not enter the post office, R walks on by the post office.
Oppenheim correctly states that P caused R to bypass the
g
post office and that
since P's action involved no com-
munication, P exercised no influ-
ence over R, and as there was no
coercion, P exercised no power
either
.
What do the two examples reveal about the basis of
making the distinction between causing and exercising power?
If a reference to intention is not the basis of distinction,
then the continued inclusion of unintended acts in the deii-
nition entangles the Oppenheim definition with the very
problem the distinction is designed to avoid. Continued
inclusion of unintended action would mean that P, who unin-
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tentionally caused R to bypass the post office, and the
school committee, which unintentionally caused the state to
withhold funds, can both be understood as exercising power.
Wi thout reference to intention alone, the Oppenheim distinc-
tion between causing and exercising power cannot be drawn.
It the distinction cannot be drawn, then the Oppenheim defi-
nition of power becomes equated with social causation.
The single path open for Oppenheim to make the distinc-
tion without reference to intention is the appropriateness
of the notions 'unintended influence' and 'unintended coer-
cion'
. Only if both notions are defensible, can the distinc-
tion between cause and power be drawn without exclusive
reference to intention. I do not think these notions can
be successfully defended.
/
In the Oppenheim example of the man bypassing the locked
post office door, every ingredient of influence, as defined
by Oppenheim, is present except one. The missing criterion
is that P's action did not involve a communication. The rea-
son no communication was involved, despite the fact that R
"got the message"
,
is that P did not convey a signal to R
that the door was locked. P's actions signaled R that the
door was locked, but P did not communicate with R because P's
actions were not intended as a message to R. Oppenheim con-
cede;., that intention is a central part of the concept 'com-
munication' by pointing out
1
...the act of communication is
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usually done with some intention
(but) the message being communi-
cated may have an effect quite
different from that intended by
the sender.
Unable to think of an act of communication, in contrast to
noise or someone overhearing a conversation, which does not
involve intention, I conclude that Oppenheim's definition of
influence must refer to only intended action.
If unintended effects of an act of communication are
to be understood as instances of exercising power, Oppen-
heim's definition encounters the same serious problem.
Writing about which effects of behavior are appropriately
O
comprehended as exercises of power, D.M. White contends that
...there is no genuine issue about
whether some state of mind (or ana-
logue thereto) is required, for if
there were, then a distinction be-
tween personal power and causation
could hardly be sustained.
The distinction could not be sustained because a definition's
ability to discriminate between exercising and failing to
exercise power would be eliminated if any effect stood as an
instance of power.
The response of another must be relevant to the intended
message or act and consistent with that intent. If such a
requirement is not maintained in a definition of power’, then
any response, including ignoring, disagreeing, and even no
response would stand as an instance of exercising power.
Power then does become equated with all causal relationship^
.
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The ability to discern when someone failed to exercise power
is lost. This loss is demonstrated by Terrence Ball's cri-
ticism of Robert Dahl for suggesting that a teacher exer
cises power over a student whether or not the student com-
plies with the order to read a book. As Ball claims
,
9
To. avoid absurdities of this sort,
one must refer to (someone's) in-
tention with respect to (another's)
behavior
.
If absurdities of this kind are not avoided, then the
success of the Oppenheim definition, when applied to the
Boston busing issue, is compromised
. The state, rather
than tailing to exercise power when it threatened to cut
off funds, would be perceived as exercising power with re-
spect to causing the committee to choose to refuse. Con-
trary to the findings of Chapter I, the state legislature
and Supreme Court could also be viewed as exercising power
because their actions had the unintended effect of stiffen-
ing the school committee's resistance to desegregation.
The inclusion of unintended effects of communication
as instances of influence, therefore, also risks equating
Oppenheim' s definition of power with social causation. If
the definition of exercising political power cannot include
reference to any and all effects, then it should not include
both intended and unintended effects
.
Failure to pay exclu-
sive attention to intentional acts and effects also seriously
undermines the success Oppenheim' s definition enjoyed when
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applied to the Boston busing issue.
The awkwardness of including unintentional action and
effects as instances of coercion, as defined by Oppenheim,
is even more apparent. The Garritty ruling is a clear exam-
ple of coercion as defined by Oppenheim. Judge Garritty
ruled in favor of implementing state desegregation plans
which caused the school committee's attempt at not desegre-
gating to end, and hence constrained the school committee
to desegregate.
The distinction between causing and coercing cannot be
established without reference to intention. All actions
which obstruct another's attempt at not doing X and con-
strain another to do X are not instances of coercion.
For the concept of coercion to be applied, rather than
the concept 'cause', someone must first be aware that ano-
ther is not attempting to do X. Having decided that the
other's doing X is desirable, someone then deliberately per-
forms some action that both stops another from not doing X,
and constrains, not causes, the other to do X. As Terrence
Ball claims ,'1" 0 (his emphasis)
...there can be no unintentional or
unconscious exercise of power, as no
one unintentionally exercises his
j udgement
.
The central ingredients of intention, awareness and deliber-
ation, characterize the concept of coercion. How else can
the distinction between causing and coercion be designed?
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The very idea of someone coercing another to do some-
thing contrary to or in the absence of the power-wielder
'
s
intent or interest suggests counter-intuitive possibilities.
Without reference to intention, the following example can
be understood (incorrectly) as an instance of coercion.
The school committee coerced the state to withhold the
funds because,
the school committee (P) refused
to begin desegregation which caused
the state's threat to withhold funds
(X)* to fail, thus constraining the
state to withhold funds.
The intuitively correct understanding is that the school
committee caused, not coerced, the state to carry through
with its threat. The school committee did not coerce the
state to do so because the school committee could not have
viewed the actual withholding as desirable. The relation-
ship between intention and coercion is further supported by
Oppenheim's use of the term "constraint" instead of cause.
Constraining someone to do X, in contrast to causing another
to do X, connotes a description of the action as deliberate
and consciously performed.
Unintended effects of an act of coercion are clearly
possible and frequently encountered. What is not so clear
is whether the presence of unintended responses allows the
*The state was only threatening to withhold funds. the
state was attempting to coerce the school committee to
begin desegregation and continue financial support
.
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concept of coercion to still apply. The very structure of
the Oppenheim definition of coercion seems to exclude unin-
tended effect as instances of coercion. The definition
refers to someone constraining another to do X, not A, B,...
W or Y and Z. Thus, if someone refuses to do X and chooses
action A or W, the other has failed to exercise coercive
power. This facet of the definition prevents the definition
from becoming equated with social causation. The limitation
builds into the definition a firm groundwork for drawing and
implementing the necessary distinction between causing and
exercising power. The limitation also implies a commitment
to intention.
Judge Garritty' s ruling, for example, was an instance
of successful coercion with regard to the school committee
ultimately implementing desegregation plans. The continued
public criticism of the ruling by school committee members;
the limited but violent opposition to the ruling; and the
media's preoccupation with publicizing the violent minority
reaction were all unintended effects of the Garritty deci-
sion. To defend inclusion of unintended effects as instances
of coercion would infer that Judge Garritty coerced the media
to downplay the generally smooth implementation of the dese-
gregation plan; coerced community members to violently pro-
test the Garritty ruling; and coerced school committee mem-
bers to persist in their public criticisms of Judge Garritty
and desegregation. That such statements overtax the concept
of coercion reveals the fundamental relationship between
coercion and intention.
In conclusion, Oppenheim has drawn a distinction be-
tween causing and exercising power. It is a distinction
which must be drawn in order to prevent his definition of
political power from becoming equated with social causation.
The distinction cannot be made without reference to inten-
tion. As Champlin reasons, (my emphasis
)
When we say 'A has power over B'
,
we
mean not simply that B can be caused
to do something by A, but more impor-
tantly that A is in a position to get
what he wants, to satisfy his purposes
or desires : if this is not so, we
-"
find it strange to discuss the situa-
tion in terms of power at all.
William Connolly's definition of power encountered
serious difficulties when applied to the Boston busing issue.
The definition could neither distinguish between the power-
ful and powerless, nor entirely explain why an action did
represent an instance of power. Connolly is a theorist who
advocates the necessity for definitions of political concepts
remaining closely associated with ordinary discourse. The
failure of the definition in this case study raises the pos-
sibility that Connolly's definition of political power is
founded upon a misperception of ordinary language.
In a value-laden ordinary discourse, a moral point of
view bears a constitutive relationship with a concept
,
according to Connolly. A concept has the criteria it does
. . 12
because of the moral point 01 view. As Connolly maintains,
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The distinctions among such notions
as persuasion, coercion, manipulation
and conditioning are built around,
and reflect shared moral considera-
1 ions
. Without the moral point of
view embodied in each, there would
be little reason to distinguish
among them.
To fashion a definition without regard to or in contradic-
tion of the moral point of view generally associated with a
concept is to transform the concept. To transform the con-
cept is to alter the action which the concept informs, and
the investigator must explain. Why then has the Connolly
definition failed when applied to the Boston busing issue?
The definition's failure can be explained by Connolly's
view that an agent need only raise the costs, risks and dif-
ficulties to exercise power over another. An amendment is
necessary to enable the Connolly definition to distinguish
between the power wielder and powerless, and to entirely
describe an action which is intuitively viewed as an instance
of power. That amendment would alter the definition and
more precisely mirror ordinary discourse. That amendment
would read:
Someone (A) exercises power over
another if he or she is responsible
for some action which raises the
costs, risks, or difficulties to
another (B) doing X, so that B
does not do X.
As amended, the definition could avoid the problems encoun-
tered when applied to the Boston busing issue and function
successfully
.
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Rather than understanding the state and Supreme Court
as exercising power over the school committee prior to 1974,
the amended definition would correctly mirror the former's
powerlessness. The following accurate statements could
then be derived from the amended definition:
The Supreme Court (A) ruled favorably
on desegregation questions, but did
not raise the costs, risks, or diffi-
culties for the school committee's (B)
segregation policy (X) so that the
school committee abandoned those segre-
gation policies.
and
,
The state government (A) passed the
Racial Imbalance Act of 1965 and with-
drew state aid from the school commit-
tee, but did not raise the costs, risks,
or difficulties for the school commit-
tee's (B) segregation policy (X) so
that the school committee abandoned
those segregation policies.
The amended Connolly definition could also entirely
capture an action which did stand as an instance of power.
The full extent of the school committee's resistance to de-
segregation prior to 1974 is revealed by the proposed amend
ment . This is an advantage over the original Connolly defi
nition because the school committee thoroughly frustrated
or restrained efforts to initiate desegregation plans.
Thoroughly frustrating state attempts to implement desegre-
gation plans is more than raising the costs, risks, and dif
ficulties for the state to do so. The following statement
accurately and fully reflects the full scope of the school
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committee and its power:
The school committee (A) delayed,
procrastinated, and evaded the state
(B) demands to begin desegregation
(X) which raised the costs, risks,
and difficulties for the state (B)
to implement desegregation plans,
so that the state (B) did not im-
plement their desegregation plans (X).
The amended Connolly definition more aptly reflects
the view of political power drawn from ordinary discourse.
An examination of ordinary discourse would suggest that the
idea of someone failing to exercise political power is
clearly possible and widely employed. Applied to the
Boston busing issue, the original Connolly definition could
not mirror this idea. By the original definition, failing
to exercise power meant that someone failed to raise the
costs, risks, or difficulties to another's doing or not
doing something. The common understanding is that someone
fails to exercise power if that someone does not or cannot,
but has tried to compel another to do or not do something.
This prevalent view is captured by the amended definition,
but is related to the original Connolly proposal. The rela-
tionship is that failing to compel another to do or not to
do something generally implies that the costs, risks, or
difficulties have not been raised enough by the frustrated
power wielder.
Connolly's interpretation of the ordinary discourse
implications regarding unintended actions is also contest-
abxe
. Connolly includes unintended action as instances of
exercising political power because persons are generally
held responsible for unintended actions. It is empirically
accurate that people are blamed or praised for actions
which they did not intend. The comprehension of unintended
actions as instances of political power, however, is not so
clear
.
The Connolly reasoning blurs and ignores a relevant
distinction inherent within ordinary discourse. That gener-
ally shared distinction is that persons are held less respon-
sible for unintended actions than for intentional acts. For
example, persons convicted of manslaughter usually receive
less punishment than convicted murderers. The lesser punish-
ment can be explained by an absence of intention. The cri-
teria of the crime 'manslaughter' also involve an absence
of intention. This differing degree of responsibility for
unintended acts is the basis for usually excluding unintended
acts from the idea of political power. To intentionally
raise the costs, risks, or difficulties for someone doing or
not doing something so that the other does or does not do
something, entails a greater blame or praise than uninten-
tionally doing so. Only the former example is appropriately
understood as an instance of exercising political power. In
the words of Terrence Ball (his emphasis), "The idea of
exercising power has the element of intention built into it.
Connolly's inclusion of unintended effects as instances
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of exercising power also represents a departure from ordinary
discourse. Unlike Oppenheim, Connolly restricts the appli-
cation of the concept 'power' to only those effects which
were known, or which someone could reasonably have been ex-
pected to know about. Connolly does correctly reason that
someone may exercise power in such a situation that, "...A
intends to help C, and in the process knowingly takes action
that harms B severely ... We would conclude that A had exer-
14 ....
cised power over B..." This distinction between intended
and known consequences is a valid one. The distinction is,
however, an irrelevant one with regard to establishing a
foundation for the inclusion of unintended effects as in-
stances of exercising power. The legal concept of trans-
ferred intent reveals that known consequences are generally
treated as if they were intended.
According to the legal concept of transferred intent ,
15
if someone performs an action which results in consequences
which the agent knows would happen, or could have reasonably
been expected to know would occur, then such consequences
are treated as if they were intended. A person is held re-
sponsible for known consequences of an action in the same
manner as if they were intended. D.M. White echoes this
general understanding when he writes about an of lice holder
who habitually makes decisions with effects he can reason-
_
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ably be expected to know about. As D.M. White contends,
...(the officeholder) must realize
that any habitual decision he makes
will have effects. If he does not
take the slight trouble of finding
out what these effects are, the
matter should be treated as if he
did have a favorable attitude
towards them.
In our society, the legal concept of transferred intent
accurately reflects generally shared understandings. Its
ability to do so lies in the empirically verifiable fact
that laws in our society are fashioned by elected represen-
tatives who are held periodically accountable to the people
they represent. The legal concept of transferred intent, as
an indicator of shared views which shape and govern the for-
mulation and use of concepts like political power, reveals
that the distance between knowing and intending is not suf-
ficient to warrant the inclusion of unintended effects as
instances of power.
Complementing the claim by Ball that intention is built
into exercising power is my argument that intention is clear
ly built into the concept ’political'. Connolly's own under
standing of what is political explicitly refers to concepts
which are identifiable with the idea of intention. Connolly
repeatedly employs the concepts 'decision' and 'choice'.
Examples of political action which Connolly suggests are,
(my emphasis) 1 ^
...actions that involve a decision
or choice among viable options. .
.
considerations or motives partici-
pants make i"n selecting one avail-
able option over others ... extent
to which decision outcome affects
the interests, wishes, values...
According to the Connolly perspective, a political action
is the outcome of a person's choice or decision, not the
result of an irrational moment or impersonal factor or so-
iv
cial structure. Robert Dahl's criteria of what is politi-
cal express agreement with Connolly. Dahl maintains that
,
18
Political action, like other human
actions, consists in making deci-
sions--in somehow choosing among
alternatives and then trying to
make one's choice effective.
The relationship between the criteria of intention discussed
earlier and the criteria of political cannot be denied.
This relationship is further support for referring exclusive-
ly to intentional action in formulating a definition of poli -
tical power
.
In conclusion, the Connolly definition does not pay
enough attention to ordinary discourse. Recognizing a
necessity to mirror the implications of ordinary discourse
in a definition of political power, Connolly overlooks sev-
eral significant features of ordinary discourse. Only an
amended form of the Connolly definition is able to support
a discrimination between exercising and failing to exercise
political power. Altering the definition to more accurately
reflect generally shared views which fashion the concept of
power is needed to permit the Connolly definition to reflect
this common understanding. The Connolly definition similai ly
ignores the pervasive distinction between responsibility
for unintended and intended action. The lesser responsi-
bility for unintended acts explains why the concept of poli-
tical power generally applies to intentional acts alone.
After all, the question is how to define political power.
De Crespigny's definition of power obviously pays at-
tention to intention. This definition of power faces none
of the problems encountered by the Oppenheim or Connolly
definitions. Specifically limiting the definition of power
to intended acts effectively eliminates the possibility
that the definition will be equated with any causal relation-
ship. Any action (X) causing response (Y) can not be pro-
perly understood as an instance of power by the de Crespigny
proposal unless the action and effects are intended.
The de Crespigny understanding of political power dis-
tinguishes between exercising power and failing to exercise
power. Unlike the Connolly definition, applying the de
Crespigny definition to the Boston busing issue reflects the
powerlessness of the state government and Supreme Court prior
to 1974. Prior to 1974, the intent of the state government
and U.S. Supreme Court to desegregate public schools did not
affect the actions of the school committee. Because the
school committee maintained, even increased the segregation
in the school system in spite of the state and Supreme Court
intention to the contrary, the state and Supreme Court failed
to exercise power over the school committee.
The single difficulty with the de Crespigny definition
is the requirement that the respondent's action must be
voluntary, in principle, for the concept 'power' to be ap-
propriate. According to de Crespigny, all human action is
voluntary. If one human exercises power over another, then
the action of the latter must be voluntary. The de Crespigny
requirement is contrary to the general understanding of
exercising power as revealed by such philosophically diverse
theorists as Oppenheim and Connolly.
19According to Oppenheim,
By restraining R from doing X, P
not only exercises power in that
respect, but also makes R unfree
to do X.
Connolly concurs with Oppenheim and fashions his understand-
ing of power from the person over whom power is exercised.
Connolly maintains^
For those tacitly or explicitly com-
mitted to the principle that persons
are worthy of respect, the distance
between persuasion and manipulation
is a moral distance; it reflects the
judgement that there is a moral pre-
sumption against the latter that does
not obtain for the former.
This problem with the de Crespigny definition is trouble-
some. The de Crespigny requirement means that the action
must be voluntary in principle. As illustrated earlier,
Judge Garritty did exercise power over the school committee
according to the de Crespigny definition. The school commit-
tee's compliance with the ruling was voluntary, in principle.
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because the committee members could have chosen to defy the
order
.
Thus de Crespigny's position raises interesting ques-
tions as to when an action is and is not voluntary. The
school committee did not freely comply. If truly free, the
committee would have continued its segregationist ways.
This difficulty with the de Crespigny definition, however,
does not disturb its success in the case study. The school
committee could have, in principle, defied the order because
that option was not eliminated by the order. The federal
court order raised the costs of defiance enough so that the
committee members complied.
The significant problem with the de Crespigny definition
is a difficulty shared by the Connolly and Oppenheim defini-
tions as well. That problem is a failure to define political
power specifically. All three theorists disregard the impli-
cations that a criteria of the concept 'politics' could have
on a definition of power. Only Connolly has developed an
explicit understanding of what is political. This Connolly
understanding does not, as I have argued, find expression in
his definition of political power, as I argue it should. Ig-
noring what is political and the effects the concept 'poli-
tical' entail for a definition of political power involves
that concept with relationships not usually understood as
political
.
It is odd to think of someone who intentionally signals
another that the post office door is locked as exercising
political power over that person if he bypasses the post
office. It is just as awkward to think that children, who
raise the costs and difficulties to their parents' effort
to have them do well in school have exercised political
power over them. Has a person who asks another to answer
the telephone, thereby affecting that person's actions in
accordance with his intentions, exercised political power
over that person who answers the telephone? I think not.
These examples support the claim that more is needed
than just limiting the concept 'political power' to inten-
tional action, as the Connolly and Dahl criteria have done.
A more basic problem is, as Terrence Ball contends, compre-
hending "...power over as paradigmatic of all intelligible
21talk about political power". The solution is what Part-
2 2
ridge would term a "field" or "zone of acceptance"
,
not
for the notion of power, but for the concept 'political',
i.e., a clear understanding of under what circumstances the
concept 'political power' is appropriate.
The issue of busing to achieve desegregation in Boston
is a helpful pathfinder through this difficulty. This case
study did not encounter the problem of whether or not the
relationships under scrutiny were properly discerned as pol
tical. The reason this was not a question is the the rela-
tionships in the case study were unquestionably political.
Elected government officials at different levels of govern-
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ment confronted each other over a question of desegregation.
Ihe judicial branch of federal government promulgated pro-
desegregation rulings which formed a backdrop for the con-
frontation in Boston. A federal court judge eventually
resolved the confrontation between state and local officials.
The issue itself seemed political because it affected a
large segment of the community which was comprised of dif-
ferent groups who held opposing views on t he question.
This character of the Boston busing issue, the parti-
cipants, and its effects reinforce Sheldon Wolin's under-
standing of political. Arguing that politics is synonymous
2 3with the public, common, or general, Wolin reasons that
...political authority is distin-
guished from other forms of auth-
ority in that it speaks in the
name of a society ... concerned
with those general interests
shared by all members of the com-
munity .
Having presented a "field" for the concept ’political',
I would amend the successful de Crespigny definition by
specifically incorporating the concept 'political' into the
definition of power. Therefore, the de Crespigny definition
would be amended to read,
...the capacity of an actor to
affect the actions of others in
accordance with his own inten-
tions, and with regard to a poli-
tical issue.
At the very least, this thesis has added yet another
"contestant" in the ongoing debate over defining the concept
'political power'
. Avoiding the difficulties encountered
by the other definitions examined in this study and remain-
ing close, if not identical to, everyday language, this
definition of political power acknowledges an admonishment
offered by Champlin. As Champlin observes,^'
While ordinary discourse about
power flows smoothly, scientific
studies of power grounded on ex-
plications appear full of limita-
tions, ambiguities and inconsis-
tencies .
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